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EDITORIAL NOTES
claims against estates of decedents which the writer has seen de-
feated by this rule of evidence. If a change from the previous
practice is advisable, it is believed that it would have been more
expedient to seek a legislative change in the rules of evidence than
to undertake to avoid the effect of the statute by introducing
complications into the rules of pleading.
-L. .
PARENT's LIABILITY FOR CHILD's NEGLIGENCE IN OPERATING
FAMILY AuTomoBnE.-The question whether the owner of an auto-
mobile bought for, and used by, his family with his premission
should be held liable for the negligence of his child while driving
the ear solely for his own pleasure, has been answered recently
for West Virginia in the case of Jones v. Cook.' In that ease the
minor stepdaughter of the. owner of a pleasure vehicle was, with
bis permission, driving it home from a football game with some
of her friends and on her way negligently injured the plaintiff.
The court below directed a verdict for the defendant which the
Supreme Court reversed. The grounds of the decision were two:
first, that the facts of ownership by the defendant and possession
by the stepdaughter raised a presumption that she was in his
service and acting on his account; second, that regardless of the
presumption, the facts were sufficient to make defendant liable
under the rule respondeat superior.
In spite of the frequency with which this question has come be-
fore the courts and the consideration given to its solution, the
direct conflict between two lines of decisions shows no signs of
abating.2  While all agree that a parent is not liable for the
wrongful acts of his child unless he induced or approved the
acts or unless the relation of master and servant existed between
them,3 one class of cases4 denies that the mere use of the family
car by a child for his own pleasure creates any such relation, and
consequently refuses to impose liability on the owner. On the other
I Ill S. E. 828 (W. Va. 1922).
2 "The Doctrine of the Family Automobile," by Edward W. Hope, 8 Am. Bar
Ass'n Jour. 359.
3 Denison v. M cNorton, 228 Fed. 401, 142 C. C. A. 631 (1916) ; Smith v. Jordan,
211 Blass. 269, 97 N. E. 761 (1912) ; Blair v. Broadwater, 121 Va. 301, 93 S. E.
632, L. R. A. 1918A, 1011 (1917). If the father entrusts his car to a very
young or incompetent son, he would be held, of course, because of his own negligence.
Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky. 926, 62 S. W. 1013 (1901).
4 Arkin v. Page, 287 IIl. 420, 123 N. E. 30 (1919) ; Watkin -v. Clark, 103 Kans.
629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918) ; Farnum v. Clifford, 118 Me. 145, 106 At. 344 (1919) ;
Weiner v. Mairs, 234 Blass. 156, 125 N. E. 149 (1919) ; Loehr v. Abell, 174 Mie.
590, 140 N. W. 926 (1913); Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, L. R. A.
1918C, 715 (1917); Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754, 71 Atl. 296, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 335 (1908); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443,
U. R. A. 1915F, 363 (1917); Blair v. Broadwater, supra n. 3.
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hand, many cases,5 perhaps a majority,6 say with the principal
case that such relation does exist on the ground that in purchasing
an automobile to be used by the family for their pleasure the
father has entered upon the business of furnishing pleasure for the
family, and the child, even in carrying out its own designs in
pleasure seeking, is acting as the father's agent or servant and
conducting the father's business thereby.
That this latter view is an extension of the doctrine respondeat
superior-"a new and anomalous slant applied by the courts to the
principles of agency,' '7 can scarcely be denied. In basing the
creation of the relation of master and servant upon the purpose
which the parent had in mind in acquiring ownership of the ve-
hicle, and the permissive use by the child, the courts "ignore an
essential element in the creation of that status as to third persons-
that such a use must be in furtherance of and not apart from the
master's service and control-and fail to distinguish between a
mere permission to use and a use subject to the control of the
master and connected with his affairs."s "The relation of master
and servant exists only between persons of whom the one has the
order and control of the work done by the other." '  Thus, an
independent contractor acts for another, but is distinguished from
an agent or servant, in that he owes no duty of obedience to his
employer as to the details of his work.10 And similarly, in the so-
called "lent servant" cases, the servant is the agent of the party
who has control over the details and management of his work."
In the principal case, the stepdaughter was using the car purely
for her own pleasure, having borrowed it for such purpose, and was
under no duty as to how, where or whom she should drive, and
was on no errand for the defendant. Hence it would seem that
she was a bailee and not a servant, just as a stranger who had
borrowed or hired the car would be a bailee.
That the owner of a motor vehicle who permits his chauffeur
to use the ear upon the personal business of the latter is not liable
5 Chafln v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. 10, L. R. A. 1916F, 216 (1915) ;
Baldwin v. Parsons, 186 N. W. 665 (Ia. 1922); Miller v. week, 186 Ky. 5M.
217 S. W. 904 (1920) ; Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091, 51
L. R. A. (N. S.) 970 (1914) ; Lewis v. Steele, 52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac. 575 (1916);
Boes v. Howell, 24 N. Mex. 142, 173 Pac. 966, L. R. A. 1918F, 288 (1918):
Davis v. Littlefleld, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. U. 487 (1914) ; King v. Smythe, 104
Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918F, 293 (1918); Birch v. Abercrombie, 74
Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59 (1913).
6 The numerical weight of authority is probably with this view. See 36
HARv. L. REV. 434; Denison v. McNorton, 8upra, n. 3.
7 Hiscock, C. J., in Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, supra, n. 4.
8 Doran v. Thomsen, supra, n. 4.
. See POLLOCK, LAw Or TORTs, 10th ed., p. 84.
10 See SALMOND, LAw or TORTs, 4th ed., (1916), § 28.
u Ibid.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1922], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss1/7
EDITORIAL NOTES
for the negligence of such chauffeur, is the view supported by the
overwhelming weight of authority,'12 and it is equally well settled
that the owner is not liable for negligence in the operation of the
machine when it is loaned to another and is used for the personal
business of the borrower. 13 The reasons given are that in such
cases the driver is not under the control of the owner, and, in
the case of the chauffeur, that he is not acting within the scope of
his master's business.' 4  This first reason would seem to apply
equally well to the stepdaughter in the principal ease. That her
father "owned the machine and had the right to say where, how
and by whom it might be used," as the West Virginia court
argues' 5 would be as true in the former cases as in the latter.
The courts which follow this family purpose doctrine do not limit
its application to minor children. Negligence of a wife in operating
the family car for her own pleasure imposes liability on the hus-
band on the same theory,' 6 while a twenty-two year old son, living
at home and borrowing the car solely for his own purposes is like-
wise a servant or agent of the owner if the car was bought for the
convenience and pleasure of the family.17 It is evident therefore
that the element of control, which heretofore has been regarded
to the existence of the master-servant relation has been lost sight
of by these courts.
The fact that this new doctrine was never recognized until the
advent of the automobile, or in the case of any other instrumental-
ity, raises a further doubt as to its soundness. If the son is his
father's agent to amuse himself with an automobile, is he any less
an agent for his own amusement with bicycles, horses, guns, golf
clubs, bats and boats, if these should happen to be provided for
the pleasure and recreation of the family, and if, "in carrying on
his father's business by the use of any of these articles, as his fath-
er's agent, to amuse his father's son, he should negligently injure
anyonel"181 Yet, the courts have uniformly refused to impose a
liability in such cases.'9
In rejecting this family purpose doctrine, the Court of Appeals
of New York said: 0 "It seems to us that the present theory is
12 Mogle v. A. W. Scott Co., 144 Blinn. 173, 174 N. W. 832 (1919) ; Cunningham
v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 111 N. Y. Sup. 1057 (1908).
1 Arkin v. Page, supra, n. 4; Doran -v. Thomsen, supra, n. 4.
14 Scheel v. Shaw, 255 Pa. 451, 97 Atl. 685 (1916) ; Gewanski v. EllswortU6
166 Wis. 250, 164 N. W. 996 (1917).
Jones v. Cook, supra, n. 1 at p. 830.
I6 Hutchins v. Haffler, 63 Colo. 365, 167 Pac. 966, U. R. A. 1918A, 1008 (1917).
17 Linch v. Dobson, 188 N. W. 227 (Neb. 1922).
Is Dunn, J. in Arkin v. Page, supra, n. 4 at p. 32.
10 Brohl v. Llngeman, 41 Mich. 711, 3 N. W. 199 (1879); Maddox V. Brown,
71 Me. 432, 36 Am. Rep. 336 (1880).
* Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, supra, n. 4, at p. 445.
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largely due to the thought that because an automobile may be more
dangerous when carelessly used than any of the other articles
mentioned, there ought to be a larger liability upon the part of
the owner, and to this end an extension of the doctrine of prin-
cipal and agent in order properly to safeguard its use .......
It seems to disclose the idea, as an essential part of the argument,
that, because an automobile is different than a horse or boat, some
advanced rules ought to be applied to its use. But the rules of
principal and agent are not thus to be formulated. They are
believed to be constant, and not variable in response to the sup-
posed exigencies of some particular situation. The question
whether one person is the agent of another in respect to some
transaction is to be determined by the fact that he represents and
is acting for him, rather than by the consideration that it will be
inconvenient or unjust if he is not held to be his agent."
In throwing the loss upon the owner, the courts have been influ-
enced undoubtedly by the dangerous character of the automobile
and by the social necessity of providing an adequate remedy for
those injured by negligent drivers who are only too often finan-
cially irresponsible. Yet, they have agreed with practical una-
nimity that the automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality
which the owner must at his peril, keep from doing harm,21 and
financial irresponsibility of an agent is not the basis of respondeat
superior, for, if it were, it would also be its measure. It is diffi-
cult to escape the conclusion that decisions such as that in the
principal case, do, in the language of President Poffenbarger in
his vigorous dissenting opinion, "contravene fundamental princi-
pies of the laws of agency and master and servant and the rule
respondeat superior,"2 2 and that if liability is to be imposed in
such cases, a different and better ground for so doing should be
found.
Indications are not wanting that the courts asserting this doc-
trine are not entirely satisfied with it and would justify their
course on the broad ground of public policy."3 If the automobile
2, Danforth v. Fisher 75 N. H. 111, 71 AtI. 535 (1908) ; Boes v. Howell, supra,
n. 5; See also 30 YALE L. J. 413; 25 W. VA. L. QUAR. 154. Contra, Southern
Cotton Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
2 Jones v. Cook, supra, n. 1 at p. 831.
2 In the case of King v. Smythe, supra, n. 5, quoted with approval in the
principal case, the Tennessee Court said: "We think the practical administration
of Justice between the parties is more the duty of the court than the preservation
of some esoteric theory concerning the law of principal and agent." And in
Graham v. Page, 132 N. U. 817 (I1. 1921), the court said: "We agree with the
Supreme Court of Tennessee that where a father provides his family with an
automobile for their pleasure, comfort and entertainment, the dictates of natural
justice requires that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation,
because only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial justice be obtained."
In the principal case also, at page 830, we find the following: "There are practical
4
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is not a dangerous instrunentality, 24 -if the parental relation-
ship alone is not sufficient to throw the loss on the owner, 5 and
if the family purpose doctrine results in an unwarranted warping
of the doctrine respondeat superior, then no other ground than
policy would seem to be available to courts that wish to impose
such a liability. But if the whole question is one of coilflicting
considerations of policy alone, 2  as it appears to be, then its solu-
tion is properly within the province of the legislatures, and not
the courts, and should not be arrived at by distorting the principles
of agency and torts to fit the case.
-E. C. D.
considerations involved to which courts cannot close their eyes. This doctrine
puts the financial resposibility of the owner behind the automobile while it is
heing used by a member of his family (who Is likely to be financially irresponsible)
in furtherance of the business and purposes for which it is maintained."N See n. 21, supra.
JO see cases in n. 3, supra.
See 25 W. VA. L. QUAn. 154; 36 HAnv. L. REv. 102.
27 See 28 HAnV. L. P~v. 91. This course has been followed in Michigan. Sec.
29 of Acts 302, Public Acts 1915, (§4825. Comp. Laws 1915). That such a law
is constitutional, see Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 184
N. W. 520, L. R. A. 1918A, 916 (1917).
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